Stated preference (SP) survey methods have been used increasingly to assess willingness to pay for a wide variety of non-market goods and services, including reductions in risks to life and health. Poorly designed SP studies are subject to a number of well-known biases, but many of these biases can be minimized when they are anticipated ex ante and accommodated in the study's design or during data analysis. We identify another source of potential bias, which we call "scenario adjustment," where respondents assume that the substantive alternative(s) in an SP choice set, in their own particular case, will be different than the survey instrument describes. We use an existing survey, developed to ascertain willingness to pay for private health-risk reduction programs, to demonstrate a strategy to control and correct for scenario adjustment in the estimation of willingness to pay. This strategy involves data from carefully worded follow-up questions and ex post econometric controls for each respondent's subjective departures from the intended choice scenario. Our research has important implications for the design of future SP surveys.
Introduction
Recent interest in behavioral economics had led researchers to revisit instances where conventional empirical models of rational consumer decision-making may have failed to provide an adequate picture of choice behavior. Bernheim and Rangel (2009) , for example, note that "it is often difficult to formulate coherent and normatively compelling rationalizations for nonstandard choice patterns" (i.e. when consumers do not choose in the way that our utilitymaximization models would predict).
Researchers have also long recognized that subjective beliefs are an important determinant of consumers' choices (Dominitz and Manski (2004) ; Manski (2004) ). For example, individuals' beliefs about the timing of their own risks for particular illnesses may determine their willingness to pay to reduce these health risks (e.g., to purchase organic foods), to measure their risks (e.g., to purchase a new diagnostic test not currently covered by insurance), or to buy extra insurance against undesirable health risk outcomes (e.g., to purchase Medi-Gap policies).
As subjective beliefs change, individual behavior will probably change as well. The individual's subjective beliefs are an example of "ancillary conditions" associated with a choice, as described in Bernheim and Rangel (2009) 
As ancillary conditions for choices, subjective beliefs are likely to play an important role when research subjects answer questions in stated preference (SP) surveys used to value nonmarket goods. An SP survey describes a scenario in which the respondent is offered a hypothetical opportunity to purchase one or more costly programs that yield particular sets of individual-specific consequences. When asked to make choices about health-related programs, for example, individuals may hold strong prior beliefs about many aspects of the alternatives in the choice scenario, including their own risks of particular illnesses, the time profile of those illness-specific risks over their lifetimes, the effectiveness of preventive actions, the effectiveness of the probable treatments, etc. When respondents hold prior beliefs about any aspect of the scenario that diverge from the researcher-prescribed information, three possibilities arise: (1) respondents may replace their beliefs about aspects of the scenario with the information provided by the researcher; (2) they may retain their beliefs and instead reject the choice scenario as irrelevant or unrealistic, often resulting in a protest response, and (3) they may accept the scenario but "adjust" some of its informational aspects to fit their own personal situation, history or context. We define "scenario adjustment" to occur in the third case, where respondents impute or modify some aspect of a given choice scenario based upon their personal beliefs, which constitute ancillary conditions for these types of choices.
This paper concerns the identification of scenario adjustment as a behavioral phenomenon affecting choices. We also illustrate one strategy for correction. We take advantage of an existing stated preference survey concerning prospective health risk reductions, described in Cameron and DeShazo (2009) . This survey is designed to elicit choices that allow the researcher to infer willingness to pay for privately purchased diagnostic programs which reduce the prospective risk that respondents will experience specific illness profiles over their remaining lifespans. An illness profile consists of a description of a sequence of future health states associated with a major illness that the respondent may experience with some baseline probability. The specific type of "scenario adjustment" problem we address in this paper has to do with each respondent's degree of acceptance of the stated latency of the illness (i.e. time until the onset of symptoms). Latency is specified as an attribute of each illness profile described in the choice sets used in the survey.
Our assessment of the consequences of scenario adjustment (and thus our potential correction strategy) is made possible because our respondents are asked appropriate debriefing questions after each stated choice question concerning alternative health-risk reduction programs.
These debriefing questions allow us to distinguish between respondents who appear to accept the latency information given in the choice scenario (and therefore presumably answer the choice question based on the latencies described in the choice scenario) from those who subjectively adjust the latency information in the scenario (and therefore appear to have answered a somewhat different question). Some individuals underestimate the latency period-they believe that the program's benefits, in their own case, would start sooner. Other individuals overestimate the latency period. If subjective latency affects willingness to pay (WTP) for risk reductions, then respondents' latency perceptions can influence their estimated WTP amounts. 1 If scenario adjustment is ignored, it is possible that this behavior on the part of respondents may cause the researcher to underestimate WTP for some respondents and overestimate WTP for others, to varying degrees. The opposing effects are unlikely to be exactly offsetting. In cases like this, researchers should probably calculate and compare estimates of WTP both with and without corrections for scenario adjustment. But this implies that as early as the process of survey design, researchers should try to anticipate the dimensions along which respondents may be inclined to adjust the stated choice scenario, despite the survey designer's best efforts. Suitable debriefing questions need to be included in the survey to permit a formal assessment of the extent of this behavior.
1 "Scenario adjustment" might occur as follows. Suppose a male respondent has a family history of heart disease at age fifty. In his copy of the survey, the stated choice scenario that involves heart disease may specify that this illness would lead to moderate and/or severe pain and disability starting at age seventy. However, given his private knowledge, he might answer the question as though the benefits of the proposed risk reduction program would begin at age fifty.
We note that corrections for scenario adjustment must be considered in relation to the practice of "libertarian paternalism" as discussed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and Smith (2007) . "Libertarian paternalism" involves honoring consumer sovereignty to the greatest extent possible (the libertarian part), but intervening to override some aspects of behavior when the researcher believes that these are mistakes (the paternalism part). For example, suppose the researcher is attempting to value removal of the health risks associated with a toxic waste site.
The survey may state a particular objective existing risk, but one-third of the survey's respondents may believe that the risk is ten times as large as the objective risk. The model could be estimated based on each individual's subjective risks. However, to generate an estimate of social benefits based on the objective risks, the researcher may counterfactually simulate what this third of the sample would have been willing to pay, had they believed the lower objective risks instead. Scenario adjustment, as described in this paper, likewise involves simulating the preference parameters that would have been estimated. In this case, the counterfactual is the case where do not approach the choice using their own subjective estimates of latency, but instead "buy" the attributes of each illness profile as described in the survey.
There is one final consideration when considering scenario adjustment in stated preference studies. Individuals may likewise adjust choice scenarios in real-life choice situations.
If "scenario adjustment" happens with similar frequency in actual markets, then perhaps these misalignments are an unavoidable part of how consumers truly behave in real markets. If a stated preference study is designed to predict future actual choice behavior, perhaps the SP choice models should allow people to make the same "mistakes" that they would make in real life.
However, if the goal is welfare assessment based on WTP under conditions of full information, then corrections are more justified. Of course, if scenario adjustment is for some reason more pronounced in hypothetical choice scenarios, as opposed to real market conditions, then perhaps the researcher should correct the misalignment in order to more accurately predict respondents' WTP under real conditions. The empirical contribution of this paper is to identify and illustrate one case of scenario adjustment by respondents to a stated preference survey, and to demonstrate the potential consequences of this behavior for the resulting estimates of WTP. The paper proceeds as follows:
Section 2 reviews in more detail the related literature on perceptions and SP. Section 3 briefly describes our survey and the data it produces. Section 4 briefly reviews a utility-theoretic choice model used to analyze respondents' program preferences. Section 5 discusses how to control for scenario adjustment and conveys our empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Researchers certainly recognize that respondents bring their beliefs and perceptions about aspects of a choice scenario into a choice setting (Manski, 2004) .
2 Researchers are also aware that the information provided in an SP choice scenario may conflict with respondents' beliefs and perceptions, in some cases because of the random assignment of attributes in efficiently designed conjoint choice sets. Some respondents may be presented with scenarios containing unrealistic or irrelevant choice alternatives, relative to the individual's beliefs, despite these being plausible for the average respondent. A tension may thus arise between the efficient design of a choice set and respondents' expectations regarding which kinds of choice alternatives are realistic or relevant (Louviere, et al. (2000) ; Louviere (2006) ).
When confronted with unrealistic or irrelevant choice scenarios, respondents may issue protest responses. Outright scenario rejection may lead a respondent to state that they prefer the status quo alternative, but they do this for reasons that have nothing to do with their preferences or the constraints they face (or they may refuse to make any choice at all). This behavior may indicate merely that they doubt the viability of the hypothetical product or proposed program, rather than implying that they would not value it if it were guaranteed to work as advertised.
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When some choices may be protest responses or belie some type of scenario rejection, then, it is important to distinguish these from "good" responses (although in practice it can be difficult to draw these distinctions). 4 Bateman, et al. (2002) suggest several methods to identify these protest responses such as follow-up questions about why respondents answered the way they did. Strazzera, et al. (2003) also offer possible corrections for selection bias caused by protest zeroes in contingent valuation studies.
Instead of outright scenario rejection, we address the phenomenon of scenario adjustment-where respondents find one or more of the attributes of the stated alternatives to be somewhat implausible but this problem does not derail the choice process entirely. Instead, the individuals may implicitly replace one or more of these implausible stated attributes with something that they deem more plausible and then make their decisions based on these mental edits to the choice set. Outright scenario rejection may be difficult enough to detect, but scenario adjustment-which is a matter of degree, rather than an all-or-nothing proposition-may be more insidious and therefore even more difficult to detect. Debriefing questions asked after respondents make the key choice(s) can be invaluable for this purpose.
SP researchers have long realized the potential for debriefing questions to help them understand the perceptions of the respondent during the choice process. A handful of researchers have already used specific debriefing questions for detection of scenario adjustment. Carson, et al. (1994) ask subjects whether they believed that the pollutants in question could actually cause the environmental problems stated in the choice scenario and whether they believed that natural processes would return things to normal within the stated number of years. When respondents said they did not believe the stated natural recovery time, they were asked if they thought the true recovery time was more or less than the stated time. In a similar vein, Viscusi and Huber (2006) ask their respondents for subjective assessments of the probability that the program in question will actually produce the advertised benefits.
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Researchers should put forth their best effort to make the choice scenarios in a stated preference survey as plausible as possible, for as many respondents as possible. Despite these best efforts, however, it may be impossible for researchers to fully anticipate the likely credibility of all dimensions of a randomized choice scenario from the perspective of every individual who might participate in the survey. The best strategy to deal with any residual scenario adjustments may be for researchers to anticipate that this behavior is inevitable in some proportion of cases and to plan for the option to assess and correct for it. Figure 1 . Each program reduces the risk that the individual will experience a specific illness profile for a major illness or injury (i.e. one of five specific types of cancer, heart attack, heart disease, stroke, respiratory illness, diabetes, traffic accident or Alzheimer's disease).
Each individual-specific illness profile is described to the respondent in terms of the baseline probability of experiencing the illness or injury, future age at onset, duration, symptoms and treatments, and eventual outcome (recovery or death). The corresponding risk reduction program is defined by the expected risk reduction and by its monthly and annual cost.
Each choice exercise is immediately followed by a set of debriefing questions designed to help the researcher understand the individual's reasons for their particular choice. Some debriefing questions depend on the alternative chosen by the respondent. For example, there are various perfectly legitimate economic reasons why individuals may prefer the status quoincluding that they cannot afford either of the risk-reduction programs which are described, they would rather spend money on other things, or they believe they will be affected by another illness before they contract either illness stated in the scenario. If respondents choose the status quo, they are asked why "Neither Program" is their preferred alternative. Included among these possible reasons are some that reveal the presence of scenario rejection, such as "I did not believe the programs would work."
Other debriefing questions are asked regardless of which alternative the individual selects.
The key question for this paper is shown in Figure 2 : "Around when do you think you would begin to value highly the risk reduction benefits of each program?" We interpret this question as being equivalent to the question "When do you think the program's benefits will start?" The benefit of the program is clearly defined on an earlier page of the survey as a reduction in the risk of suffering from the specified major illness or injury starting at the age stated in the scenario. If the respondent fully accepts the stated scenario, then the age at which the scenario states the benefits start should match the age at which the respondent believes the benefits will start.
Module 4 of the survey contains additional debriefing questions which permit validation of other dimensions of the individual's responses. Module 5 is collected separately from the survey and contains the respondent's sociodemographic characteristics and a detailed medical history, including which major diseases the individual has already faced.
A Random Utility Choice Model
This paper is based on an empirical specification similar, although not identical, to that used in Cameron and DeShazo (2009) . In that paper, it is established that stated choices appear to be best predicted by a model that involves expected discounted utility from durations in different types of future health states. Indirect utility is also modeled as additively separable, but non-linear, in present discounted expected net income. If utility is modeled flexibly as a quadratic function of net income, the most basic specification is a five-parameter model. To further simplify notation, let
Adapting the model in Cameron and DeShazo (2009), the expected utility-difference that drives the individual's choice between Program A and the status quo can then be specified as:
Where 0  and 1  are the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms in net income in the underlying indirect utility function. The five terms in braces can be constructed from the data,
given specific assumptions about the discount rate. 11 In our tables of results, the constructed variables in the first two sets of braces, modified by the coefficients 0  and 1  , will be referenced simply as "first income term" and "second income term."
In the sense of Graham (1981) , the "option price" for Program A is defined as the maximum common certain payment that makes the individual just indifferent between paying for the program and enjoying the risk reduction, or not paying for the program and not enjoying the risk reduction. The annual option price ˆA i c that makes the expression in equation (1) exactly equal to zero can be calculated as
is the solution to a quadratic form.
Then, the expected present value of this stream of payments must be calculated over the individual's remaining nominal lifespan:
Finally, to convert this expected present-value option price into a measure that Cameron and
DeShazo (2009) (1) is dominated by a specification that is not merely linear in the terms involving present discounted health-state years. First, we factor out the probability differences in the final terms in equation (1) as: 
log 1 log 1 log 1 log 1 log 1 log 1
The opportunity for longer durations in each health state is correlated with the youth of the respondent. Thus, it is also important to allow the  coefficients to differ systematically with the respondent's current age wherever this generalization is warranted by the data. This leads to a model where 13 One final additional parameter is featured in these models. It accommodates a correction for sample representativeness. Cameron and DeShazo (2009), in Appendix D, estimate the determinants of membership in the estimating sample, relative to the original half-million general population panel recruitment contacts by Knowledge Networks, Inc. These models permit construction of fitted response probabilities for each consumer in the estimating sample. These response probabilities can be expressed as deviations from the central tendency in response probabilities across the recruitment pool. Only the coefficient on the term in discounted illness-years is shifted to a statistically significant extent when the subject's response probability deviates from the average. Thus the model includes a shift variable on that coefficient by employing the interaction term
Controlling for Scenario Adjustment with Respect to Latency
Recall that after each choice scenario, respondents are asked debriefing questions about when they believe that the benefits of each proposed program would begin-for them personally.
Based on the answers to each of the questions in Figure 2 , we define two variables. First,
1( ) j i
never is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the individual responds by checking "Never (Program would not benefit me)." Our second variable, 14 In Appendix A to this paper, available from the authors, we explore the relationships between each of our two scenario adjustment variables and an array of explanatory variables specific either to the individual or to the choice scenario. In the body of the paper, however, we use the observed values of these variables, rather than fitted values. Many respondent characteristics contribute significantly to explaining variation in these two variables, but as can be
The usual intent within a stated preference study is to induce individuals to accept the stated choice scenario as fully as possible and for them to respond conditional on that acceptance.
If respondents selectively reinterpret the question (i.e. adjust the choice scenario) before they answer, then this violates an important maintained hypothesis behind the random utility model that produces the utility parameter estimates which are the foundation of most stated preference studies. We thus use the "observed" values of 1( ) j i never and j i overest constructed from the debriefing questions associated with each of the 15,040 illness profiles presented to our respondents to control and correct for scenario adjustment with respect to the latency attribute.
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in these models are presented in Table 1 . expenditure on all other goods and services), the five basic  parameters ( 10 20 30 40 50 , , , ,
appearing in the illness profile term in expression (5)  , 4  and 5  , and the single coefficient, 13  , on the interaction term between the fitted sample participation probability and the sick-years term.
To effect corrections for scenario adjustment, our two scenario adjustment variables, 1( ) j i never and j i overest , are initially allowed to shift every one of these fourteen utility seen from the R-squared values for these fitted models, it is difficult to predict accurately either of the two scenario adjustment variables based solely on observed characteristics of each individual.
parameters. If we represent each of these parameters generically as  , the new model substitutes a systematically varying parameter as follows:
for a total of 52 parameters in the fully generalized specification. 16 In Table 2 , however, we report results for a parsimonious version that retains only those shift variables which are individually statistically significant.
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Model 1 in Table 2 gives the utility parameter estimates which result when the possibility of scenario adjustment is completely ignored during estimation. Model 2 in the same table In Model 2, where we measure and correct for scenario adjustment, the magnitudes of some of the shift parameters are striking. The second column of results for Model 2 shows the significant shifts in each of these utility parameters when the respondent states that they will 15 In a set of preliminary models, we employed both 1(
never and a pair of indicator variables for over-or underestimation (relative to none) to shift each of the  parameters in the general model. The results were qualitatively similar to those reported here. 16 Results for these fully generalized 52-parameter models are contained in Appendix B, available from the authors. 17 We acknowledge that these variables may be, to some extent, jointly endogenous with the underlying willingness to pay for health risk reductions because they are reported by the same individuals. In Appendix A, available from the authors, we note that despite the considerable number of statistically significant coefficients in our models to explain j i overest , we are only able to explain (at best) about 35% of its variation across illness profiles using the large number of explanatory variables we have available.
never benefit from the program in question. The third column shows the significant shifts in these parameters for a one-unit increase in j i overest .
The marginal utility of income from Model 2 serves as the denominator in the marginal rate of substitution (between each illness profile attribute and income) that gives the estimated marginal willingness to pay associated with each attribute. Overestimation of the latency appears to be associated with a higher estimated marginal utility of income, which means a lower WTP. The perception that a particular program will never benefit the respondent also appears to undo the evidence for a diminishing marginal utility of income. For these cases, WTP is no longer greater at higher incomes, whereas this appears to be the case when respondents fully accept the stated latencies.
There are also a number of important differences for "scenario adjusters" among the coefficients on the illness profile terms. In two cases (for the linear term in the shifted log of discounted sick years, and for the interaction term between the shifted logs of discounted sickyears and discounted lost life-years), the discrete shift in the parameter associated with the perception that the program will never provide any benefit is sufficient to completely change the sign of the effect. In two other cases, the sign of the coefficient remains the same but the coefficient more than doubles in size. Whenever the coefficients on the interaction terms involving j i overest are statistically significant, they bear a sign that is opposite to the baseline coefficient on the same term. Scenario adjustments can thus have a clearly discernible impact upon estimated marginal utilities.
The magnitudes of the shift parameters reported for Model 2 in Table 2 appear fairly large, but to appreciate the overall effects of these parameter changes on demand estimates, it is necessary to simulate distributions for the implied (normalized) willingness-to-pay estimates.
Bear in mind that the U.S. EPA, for example, relies upon an overall average value of a statistical life (a VSL associated with sudden death in the current period) of about $6-$7 million, whereas for transportation policies, the VSL numbers typically used have historically been closer to $3-$4 million, although they have been revised upward somewhat in recent years. In Table 3 , we show selected r WTP  estimates for specified individuals and conditions. We consider, in succession, an individual who is 30, 45, or 60 years old. In all cases, the individual earns an income of $42,000 per year. The illness profiles involve shorter (and longer) illnesses with "recovery," shorter (and longer) illnesses followed by death, and sudden death with no preceding period of illness. The "sudden death" r WTP  estimates, when multiplied by one million, are most comparable to conventional VSL estimates.
18
Scenario adjustment in this illustration concerns illness latency, so two different latency periods are considered. In the first pair of columns in Table 3 , we specify that each illness commences immediately (i.e. with no latency period). In the second pair, we specify a latency period of twenty years. In each pair of columns, the initial uncorrected r WTP  estimates are calculated from the uncorrected parameters of Model 1 in Table 2 . The corrected r WTP  numbers are calculated using the baseline coefficients from Model 2 in Table 2 , which have been corrected for any scenario adjustments reported by respondents. Table 3 shows that for the "No Latency" illness profiles, the corrected r WTP  estimates are mostly higher than those produced by the model that does not take scenario adjustment into account. The most dramatic differences are for longer and fatal illnesses for 60-year-olds, where 18 The illnesses described in our choice scenarios are all major illnesses, including most of the ailments from which people eventually die. It is clear from our analysis that people do not assume that their health status "after" one of these illnesses, should they recover, will be equivalent to their pre-illness state. Thus the value of avoiding a oneyear major illness includes the value of avoiding the ensuing post-illness health state. It will not be the same as the value of avoiding just that year of illness, separate from any ensuing years in an incompletely recovered state.
the uncorrected model suggests a r WTP  of less than $1, whereas the corrected estimate is $6.93.
The only exceptions (where the corrected estimates are lower than the uncorrected estimates) are for some of the illnesses which are not fatal. The difference in the corrected and uncorrected r WTP  estimates suggests that if scenario adjustment is not taken into account, willingness to pay estimates for many illness profiles of this type may be biased downward. This type of bias may result in the recommendation that some programs or policies that reduce illnesses and injuries with no latency (i.e. where benefits start immediately) should not be implemented when it may actually be welfare-increasing to put these measures into effect.
In contrast, the corrected estimates for illness profiles that have a latency of 20 years are almost all lower than the uncorrected estimates. The 90% simulated distributions for these r WTP  measures often include zero. The only two anomalies, where the corrected estimates are higher, are for the non-fatal illness profiles for 30-year-olds. This suggests that failure to take into account scenario adjustment could cause some programs or policies that address longlatency health risks to be implemented when they are not actually welfare-enhancing from the current perspective of most age groups. These differences in the corrected and uncorrected r WTP  estimates show how important it may be to acknowledge and correct for scenario adjustments in stated preference research.
Conclusions
The absence of suitable market data sometimes forces researchers to use stated preference methods to assess demand for fundamentally non-market (or pre-test-market) goods or services.
Given economists' skepticism about the reliability of stated preference data, researchers in fields where adequate market data tend to be scarce have systematically addressed many recognized problems with these alternative demand-measurement methodologies. One problem with SP research has been the occurrence of protest responses or scenario rejection, where respondents completely refuse to play along with the hypothetical choice exercise because they do not believe (or agree with) some aspect of the choice scenario. This paper addresses the related but potentially more subtle problem of scenario adjustment. Respondents do make the stated choices requested of them, but they first implicitly revise the choice scenario to better capture what would be the implications of each alternative in their own particular case.
Scenario adjustment may be more likely in situations where the alternatives involved in the choice problem are less easy to perceive and appreciate. For example, it may be possible to describe, unambiguously, the relevant attributes of alternative brands of dishwashing soap, in which case scenario adjustment would be unlikely. In contrast, it may be very difficult to completely describe the relevant attributes of a program to enhance the survival of an endangered species, where even the experts cannot predict for certain whether the program will be effective.
Choices that involve heterogeneous risks or uncertain outcomes, such as the reduction of health risks, may be the most vulnerable to scenario adjustment, since there is great variability in how different people perceive risks and uncertainty.
Assessment and correction for scenario adjustment is easier and can be more systematic if suitable debriefing questions about each key choice scenario are posed in the survey. The specific debriefing question used in our empirical illustration in this paper is very useful, but it may still have been less than ideal. Carefully planned questions of this type, however, can help the researcher identify those individuals who acknowledge that they do not believe that the preceding choice scenario, exactly as stated, applies to them. Where possible, debriefing questions can also be used to quantify the likely extent to which individuals may have adjusted the scenario. With information about the extent of scenario adjustments, researchers can explicitly model the effects of scenario adjustment on the estimated utility parameters in their choice models. This allows counterfactual simulations of the individual's most likely response, had they answered the question exactly as it was asked. These types of simulations, with systematic correction for scenario adjustment, presumably permit more accurate estimates of demand.
The data used in this study suggest that some individuals may indeed update some aspects of choice scenarios so that these scenarios better apply to their own personal situations.
We use an empirical choice model that allows our utility parameter estimates to differ systematically according to the respondent's own reports of possible scenario adjustment with respect to latency periods. Our estimation results show that our counterfactually simulated WTPtype benefits estimates-corrected for scenario adjustment-are often noticeably different from the uncorrected estimates. For example, our empirical estimates suggest that after correction for scenario adjustments, programs that benefit people now have mainly higher estimates, while programs that benefit people twenty years into the future have mainly lower estimates. These differences in estimated demands are big enough that they could potentially make the difference between enacting a policy that is warranted on a benefit-cost criterion and failing to enact it.
Given our findings and the differences in demand estimates (with and without correction) in this illustration, we infer that scenario adjustment is likely to be inevitable and potentially influential, in at least some proportion of cases, in many other applications as well. Debriefing questions to permit assessment and correction of scenario adjustment should probably be a regular feature of SP surveys. Likewise, formal modeling of scenario adjustment and its impact on the final estimates of interest should probably be a routine component of sensitivity analysis in empirical work using stated preferences. Researchers should at least report the extent to which their main results may be affected by this type of correction. Such information would allow the policy-makers to decide which types of "misalignments" between respondent and researcher information sets warrant correction, and therefore which demand estimates should be preferred.
Plott, C.R., Zeiler, K. (2005) . "The willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap, the 'endowment effect,' subject misconceptions, and experimental procedures for eliciting valuations", American Economic Review 95, 530-545.
Poor, P.J., Boyle, K.J., Taylor Choose the program that reduces the illness that you most want to avoid. But think carefully about whether the costs are too high for you. If both programs are too expensive, then choose Neither Program.
If you choose "neither program", remember that you could die early from a number of causes, including the ones described below. a Corrected utility parameters are purged of scenario adjustment as captured by systematic differences in these parameters for alternatives where stated latency was not accepted by the respondent. a Based on random draws from the joint distribution of the estimated parameters. b Zero latency was implausible to respondents in the illness profiles used to elicit program choices, so the minimum latency in the choice scenarios was 1 year. These values are thus extrapolated, based upon the fitted model. c Respondents were given no opportunity to express negative willingness to pay, so negative simulated values should be interpreted as zero WTP.
APPENDIX A (to be made available online)
In this Appendix, we carefully consider the empirical correlates of our two scenario adjustment indicators. Table A-1 gives descriptive statistics for these variables and a set of regressors we used to explain systematic variations in their magnitudes. First, we use a simple binary logit model to examine how the value of the indicator variable 1( ) j i never can be explained by a wide variety of (a) characteristics of the respondent, and (b) attributes of the health risk targeted by each program. Each respondent considers ten different health risk-reduction programs, in five sets of two, with each choice set including the status quo as a third alternative.
In total, therefore, 15,040 substantive illness profiles and health-risk reduction programs are considered in the 7,520 choice scenarios analyzed in this paper. For 1,156 (7.69%) of these illness profiles, respondents indicated their belief that they would never benefit from the riskreduction program. Table A -2 are ad hoc binary logit models to explain these 7.69% of cases where 1( ) j i never =1. Missing data for some of the explanatory variables used in these preliminary exploratory models accounts for the reduction of the number of illness profiles from 15,040 to 13,626. The logit specification suggests that people are more likely to say that a particular program will never benefit them if they are female, if they currently have a larger number of other illnesses, if they feel at greater subjective risk for getting other illnesses, if they are a member of a larger household, or if they are a single parent. People are less likely to say the program will never benefit them if they are presented with an illness profile that includes long-term pain and/or disability, if they have not attended college, if they acknowledge a higher subjective risk of getting this disease, if they have (on average) more room to improve their health habits, and if they currently have children in their household. Now we explore the determinants of our approximately continuous measure of the "minimum overestimate of the latency," in this case using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Table A -3 demonstrate the significant determinants of j i overest across a variety of alternative specifications. Missing data for some of the regressors again reduces the estimating sample, this time from 13,884 to 12,596 illness profiles. The coefficients on age and age-squared are highly significant in the first two models when latency variables for the specified illness profiles are left out of the model. When latency variables are included (as in Models 3 through 5), the coefficients on the age variables are no longer statistically significant. 20 The scenario adjustment data with respect to latency thus suggests that underestimation predominates. This may reflect opinions that acute cases of major illness do not typically come as a complete surprise. They often occur after years of decline in the individual's general level of health.
Models 1 and 2 in
It is likely that latency effects are captured by the age variables in the first two models. The insignificant age terms are dropped from the specification in Model 4.
Model 5 demonstrates the consequences of using an interval-data model rather than Models 4 and 5 suggest that individuals are more likely to overestimate the latency period when they consider an illness profile with a longer period of pain or disability, if the illness profile has pain/disability lasting more than 60 months, if they feel at greater subjective risk for other illnesses, if they belong to a two-income household, or if they will have a child under the age of eighteen in the household at the time of the stated onset of the disease. Individuals are more likely to assume that the latency in their own case will be less than the stated latency in the survey if they have not attended college, if they already have the illness in question, if they have a larger number of other major illnesses, if they feel at a higher subjective risk for this illness, if they have (on average) more room to improve their health habits, or if they have children or are single parents. The length of the latency period stated in the illness profile is also an important determinant of j i overest . Not surprisingly, a longer stated latency period in the scenario makes respondents more likely to underestimate the latency and vice versa. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. MOEL as an interval rather than as an approximately continuous variable. This is done using the upper and lower estimates of the stated latency of the benefits of the program and using the intreg command in Stata. Table 3 in the main body of the paper gives parameter estimates from our model that corrects for scenario adjustment where all interaction terms with persistently insignificant coefficients have been dropped. Table B-1 in this Appendix provides the estimates for a model with the complete set of interactions.
APPENDIX B (to be made available online)

B.1 Extensive, rather than parsimonious, version of main model
B.2 Extensive and parsimonious versions of a "small" model
It may be important to demonstrate that the statistical significance of the interaction terms involving the two scenario adjustments variables in this study are not an artifact of the non-linear functional form of the specification in the main model. Tables B-2 and B-3 demonstrate that there are significant shifts in the estimated parameters even in simpler five-parameter versions of the specification for the program choice model.
B.3 Under-or over-estimate of latency (ordered discrete variable)
In addition to the interval-data model for the overest variable documented in Model 5 in Appendix A, Table A Figure 2 contains the stated age of onset, and take a value of 2 if the lower bound of the age interval lies strictly above the stated age of onset in the choice scenario. In these data, latency is underestimated for about 54.6% of illness profiles, and it is overestimated for about 10.3% of profiles.
Results for this model are displayed in Table B -2. Individuals are more likely to overestimate the latency of the illness if they have finished only high school, have temporary or long-term pain described the illness profile stated in the scenario, or will likely have a current child still in their household at the stated onset of the disease. Individuals are more likely to underestimate the length of the latency if they have a lower income, have either this illness or another major illness, have a higher subjective risk for this illness, have children, or will likely have a current child still in their household at the stated onset of the disease. 
